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Terrorism Insurance and Commercial Real Estate:
The New Frontier
I. INTRODUCTION
The new frontier for the real estate and insurance
industries is the introduction of terrorism insurance. Terrorism
insurance is now mandated by lenders for most commercial real
estate properties to insure against losses resulting from acts of
terror.1 The new insurance requirements became problematic
when reinsurers, and then primary insurers, excluded acts of
terrorism from their coverage.2 Separate insurance policies were
difficult to obtain because insurers simply were not offering
terrorism insurance? The few companies that did offer terrorism
insurance charged extremely high premiums.' Many borrowers
and lenders, unable to secure coverage, found their investment-
grade loans downgraded by rating agencies. Responding to these
1. See infra notes 47-84 and accompanying text; see, e.g., DANIEL B. RUBOCK &
TAD PHILIPP, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, CMBS: MOODY'S APPROACH TO
TERRORISM INSURANCE FOR U.S. COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE (Mar. 1, 2002); Albert
Warson, Rebooting Terrorism Insurance, MORTGAGE BANKING, Sept. 1, 2002, at 56,
available at 2002 WL 11226773. Most policies do not cover loss from chemical or
biological acts of terrorism. Eugene A. Pinover, Lisa M. Zana & Joseph Philip Forte,
Terrorism Insurance After September 11: Is Federal Assistance Needed?, 22 SHOPPING
CENTER LEGAL UPDATE 13, 14 (Summer 2002).
2. See infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Jane Kendall,
Comment, The Incalculable Risk: How the World Trade Center Disaster Accelerated
the Evolution of Insurance Terrorism Exclusions, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 569, 583-88
(2002).
3. See infra notes 59-68 and accompanying text; Gregg J. Loubier & Jason B.
Aro, Insuring the Risks of Terror: Questions of the Cost and Application of Terror
Insurance Remain Open, L.A. LAWYER, Sept. 2002, at 18, 19, available at LEXIS,
Nexis Library, LOSAL File.
4. See infra notes 59-68 and accompanying text; Loubier & Aro, supra note 3, at
19.
5. See infra notes 114-119 and accompanying text; TAD PHILIPP & PAMELA
DENT, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, MOODY'S DOWNGRADES ELEVEN AND
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problems, Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of
2002, a federal insurance backstop.6 Though it is too early to
determine the industry implications of the Act, there are several
remaining considerations for lenders and borrowers, and many
readjustments for the real estate and insurance industries.7
Effects of the terrorism insurance "problem" are
widespread.8  A study of commercial real estate owners,
developers, and lenders blamed lack of available terrorism
insurance for the delay or cancellation of more than $11.7 billion
in real estate projects since September 11, 2001, 9 while President
George W. Bush cited a study showing delay or cancellation of
more than $15 billion in projects.'" More than $7 billion worth of
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)" were suspended
or cancelled in the year following the attacks. 2  The week of
September 22, 2002, Moody's Investors Service cut the rating of
$4.5 billion in CMBS; eleven separate AAA-rated securities were
downgraded because of insufficient terrorism insurance. 3 The
White House also blamed terrorism insurance issues for the loss of
79,000 real estate and construction jobs in the month of April 2002
CONFIRMS TWO SINGLE ASSET AND LARGE LOAN CMBS TRANSACTIONS CITING
TERRORISM INSURANCE CONCERNS 1 (Sept. 27, 2002).
6. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (to
be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6701 Note); see infra notes 141-154 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 189-244 and accompanying text for some examples.
8. See infra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
9. Karen L. Werner, Real Estate Survey Finds $11.7 Billion in Projects Affected
by Terror Coverage, 79 BANKING REP. 363 (Sept. 9, 2002).
10. See Sarah Lockyer & Nicole Duran, In Brief: Compromise on Terror
Insurance?, AM. BANKER, Oct. 4, 2002, at 19.
11. CMBS refers to the process of pooling mortgages and selling the pool to a
special purpose vehicle (SPV). Alan Kronovet, Note, An Overview of Commercial
Mortgage Backed Securitization: The Devil is in the Details, 1 N.C. BANKING INST.
288, 289 (1997). The investment risk of the pool is rated by a national rating agency
(i.e. Moody's, Standard & Poor's). Id. The SPV then divides the pool into classes
and sells an interest in the class to a third party investor. Id. Thus, loans are
"converted into securities in order to gain access to the capital markets." Id. at 288.
12. Warson, supra note 1, at 56. According to The Bond Market Association,
another $36 billion in CMBS may have been affected if federal terrorism insurance is
not passed. Pinover et al., supra note 1, at 15.
13. See Norma Cohen, The High Costs of Terrorism: Even Owners of Trophy
Assets in New York Have Been Unable to Obtain Full Terrorism Insurance Cover,
Triggering a Series of Investment Downgradings by Ratings Agencies, FIN. TIMES
(London), 2" Ed., Oct. 4, 2002, at 29.
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alone. 4 Lack of terrorism insurance is the common denominator
contributing to these drastic effects on the commercial real estate
and insurance industries, investors, and American workers.
This Note will examine the changing landscape of terrorism
insurance for lenders, borrowers, insurance companies, and
investors, and will suggest solutions to the problems that have
arisen. First, it will examine the problem posed by the lack of
terrorism insurance for the insurance industry and commercial real
estate development. 5 Second, it will discuss the effect lack of
terrorism insurance had on the CMBS markets and show how
rating agencies are adjusting to the new CMBS landscape. 16 Next,
it will look at the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 and the
debate surrounding this legislation to subsidize terrorism
insurance. 7 Finally, this Note will evaluate what lenders and
insureds should consider when purchasing a terrorism insurance
policy."
II. THE PROBLEM
A. Insurance: Lack of Funds, Lack of Insurance
The insurance industry was thought to have sufficient funds
to cover a major catastrophic event, assuming the loss totals were
not in excess of $50 billion.19 Estimates of claims on the insurance
industry for losses from September 11, 2001, however, range from
$60 billion20 to as high as $100 billion.2' As the total claims
14. Warson, supra note 1, at 56.
15. See infra notes 19-84 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 85-126 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 127-188 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 189-244 and accompanying text.
19. See Kendall, supra note 2, at 570 n.3. "[T]he totals would have to exceed
[fifty billion dollars] before we would begin to worry about the insurance system."
Scott Farley, U.S. Attack 'Will Not Cripple the Insurance Industry,' INS. DAY
(London), Sept. 18, 2001, at 3 (quoting Steven J. Dreyer, Managing Director for U.S.
Insurance Industry Ratings at Standard & Poor's).
20. Alexandra Glickman, Insurance and Commercial Mortgages in the New
World of Risk, in COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FINANCING: WHAT BORROWERS AND
LENDERS NEED TO KNOW Now, REAL ESTATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 537, 539 (Practising Law Institute ed., Feb. 2002).
21. Loubier & Aro, supra note 3, at 18.
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increased from the attacks on the World Trade Center,22 so did
anxieties about insurance funding. One industry representative
stated, "the private insurance industry lacks the capital and
resources to protect against the immense destructive power of
modern warfare and.., organized terrorism., 24  Fear that the
insurance industry could not survive another disaster in the near
future on par with that of the World Trade Center prompted
insurers to exclude acts of terrorism from their policies.2 5
The role of insurance is to "relieve one party of the burden
of uncertainty associated with potential losses, while allowing the
other party to profit from their reasonable calculability., 26 Risk is
generally calculated by a statistical analysis termed the "law of
large numbers," which provides some calculability to the unknown
risk.27  Terrorism, however, proves to be a more difficult
calculation.28 Some models attempt to determine risk based on the
premise that the more prominent the real estate, the more likely it
will be the target of a terrorist act.29  This may seem a logical
deduction; however, it fails to acknowledge several important
variables.3" History shows that terrorist acts could occur just as
easily at a local bar or office building.3 There is also a possibility
that buildings around prominent real estate assets will be
22. This article does not address the additional claims for life insurance, car
insurance, etc. resulting from the attack on the World Trade Center. This article
limits discussion to the property claims resulting from building and structural damage
due to the events of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing consequences.
23. See, e.g., Lee Ann Gjertsen, Insurers - Only 2 Fail; Diversified Risk Helps,
AM. BANKER, Sept. 6, 2002, at 10. Two insurance companies, one Japanese and one
Danish, became insolvent because of claims from September 11. Id.
24. H. Rodgin Cohen, Address at the University of North Carolina School of
Law Banking Law Institute (April 4, 2002) (transcript on file with the North Carolina
Banking Institute).
25. See Kendall, supra note 2, at 583-87.
26. Id. at 572.
27. See id. The "law of large numbers" examines a large sample of events to
determine the statistical probability of an event occurring. Id. at 572 n.15.
28. See id. This statistical process demonstrates the inherent incalculability of
catastrophic terrorist attacks, because their occurrence is too rare to accurately
predict the likelihood of similar events. See id.
29. See Loubier & Aro, supra note 3.
30. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
31. See Loubier & Aro, supra note 3 (stating that a suburban pizza parlor is just
as likely to be hit as a national landmark).
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destroyed.32 One commentator suggests that no model can predict
catastrophes like the events of September 11 because they are too
rare and are, by definition, outliers.33  In addition, models
generally fail to consider political and social factors that motivate
terrorists.34 Some argue that the risk is so difficult to quantify, that
acts of terrorism are actually uninsurable. 3' Although prominent
buildings are generally first among anticipated targets, "every
place is at risk to some degree.
' 36
Due to the lack of funds and lack of predictability,
reinsurers began excluding acts of terrorism shortly after
September 11.3' Reinsurers assume a portion of policy risks,
allowing primary insurers to accept more risk than otherwise
allowed, thereby increasing the total market capacity.38 Primary
insurers are still contractually obligated to pay policyholders in the
event of loss, regardless of whether they are reimbursed by
reinsurers.39 Insurance sold to consumers is subject to approval
and review by state regulatory agencies, and regulators were
reluctant to allow exclusions for acts of terrorism. ° Without
32. See John Holusha, Uncertainty In a Landscape Transformed, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 2001, § 11. This could occur from a failed attempt to destroy the prominent
building or, as with some smaller buildings around the World Trade Center, after-
effects of an attack which cause damage to a nearby building not necessarily a
terrorist target. See Mark Adelson, David P. Jacob, & Joshua Phillips, Trends in
Securitization: Research Perspective, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIZATION,
COMMERCIAL LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 193, 218 (Practising
Law Institute ed., Dec. 2001). A New York Times article listed 30 million square feet
of office space affected by the events of September 11, 2001, amounting to 36% of
the total downtown space. Id.
33. See Mark H. Adelson, How the Events of September 11 Affect Thinking about
Risk, CMBS WORLD, Summer 2002, at 54, 59.
34. Id.
35. Loubier & Aro, supra note 3, at 20.
36. Id.
37. See Kendall, supra note 2, at 583-84 (explaining that reinsurance companies
can revise terms more easily than insurance companies because they do not need
state regulator approval to do so).
38. See id. at 579. "Primary insurers rely on the foreign and domestic reinsurance
markets to assume a portion of the risk they underwrite." James G. Rizzo, Tragedy's
Aftermath: The Impact of 9/11 on the Insurance Industry, 46 BOSTON BAR J. 10, 10
(2002).
39. See Kendall, supra note 2, at 581.
40. See id. at 585. Kendall stated that the reluctance stemmed from concern for
businesses and consumers that need to protect themselves from losses incurred from
acts of terrorism. Id.
2003]
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international reinsurers to back up their policies and absorb some
of the risk, primary insurers were left with more outstanding risks
than they could cover." State regulators realized the plight of the
insurance companies and approved terrorism exclusions for
primary insurers.42 The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 now
preempts these state-approved exclusions and requires that the
exclusions be eliminated if the losses that are insured under the
Act are those excluded under the current insurance contract.43
B. Lenders: Potential for Loan Defaults
Mortgage terms generally require that the mortgaged
property have "all risk" insurance as well as other types of
insurance that may be reasonably requested by the lender.44 There
are certain generally recognized exclusions from "all risk"
insurance, including damage resulting from earthquake, flood, and
acts of war.45 If a type of insurance is required by the lender, but
excluded from the "all risk" policy, the borrower must purchase
separate insurance.46 Before September 11, 2001, "all risk"
policies generally included damage and loss resulting from an act
41. See id. at 585-86. The plight of primary insurers was particularly urgent
because seventy percent of their reinsurance "treaties" expired on January 1, 2002.
RUBOCK & PHILIPP, supra note 1, at 4.
42. See Kendall, supra note 2, at 587. California, Georgia, and New York did not
approve the terrorism exclusion proposed by the Insurance Services Office and
endorsed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. Pinover et al.,
supra note 1, at 14. California provided several concerns with the exclusion as
proposed by the Insurance Services Office, including an arbitrary definition of a
terrorist "incident" and an unreasonably low damage threshold at twenty-five million
dollars country-wide. Loubier & Aro, supra note 3, at 19.
43. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, §105(b), 116 Stat.
2322 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6701 Note).
44. Force Placement of Terrorism Coverage Leads to Litigation, NAT'L.
MORTGAGE NEWS, July 15, 2002, at 8, available at 2002 WL 8159892.
45. See Loubier & Aro, supra note 3, at 18. Insurers chose not to claim "act of
war" exclusions for the events on September 11 in large part for public relations
reasons, but also because they did not expect the court to find the attack an act of
war. See Kendall, supra note 2, at 571. The act of war exclusion typically requires the
perpetrator to be an agent of a sovereign government or power. See Loubier & Aro,
supra note 3, at 19.
46. Telephone interview with Alan Kronovet, Vice President, Wachovia
Securities (Sept. 24, 2002) [hereinafter Kronovet interview]; see also Loubier & Aro,
supra note 3, at 19 ("[A]ny insured that wants or needs to buy terrorism insurance
now must obtain separate terrorism coverage if it is available.").
ANTI-TERRORISM BANKING ISSUES
of terrorism; now they do not.47 These exclusions did not affect
property owners until lenders required their property to have
terrorism insurance coverage.48 If terrorism coverage is required
and the borrower fails to obtain it, the lender may place the
borrower in default for inadequate insurance under the terms of
the loan.49 This is, of course, dependent upon the requirement
being reasonable. ° Reasonableness of such a requirement is still
open to interpretation."
There are several standards by which lenders are requiring
terrorism insurance.52 The most stringent standard is a specific
requirement that the borrower obtain coverage for terrorism; the
next most stringent standard is a requirement of coverage if it is
commercially available, regardless of cost; the next is a
requirement of coverage if it is commercially reasonable to obtain
(considering both availability and cost); and the most lenient is no
express obligation to obtain coverage." The applicable standard
generally depends upon the asset's apparent risk and the
negotiating strength of the borrower.54 Rating agencies, and
presumably investors, would ideally prefer the strictest standard.55
However, requiring the borrower to obtain terrorism insurance
outright has led to some lawsuits,56 including lawsuits relating to
the Mall of America and the Conde Nast Building at 4 Times
Square.57 In these cases, because the coverage was available but
47. Glickman, supra note 20, at 541; Loubier & Aro, supra note 3, at 18-19.
48. See Loubier & Aro, supra note 3, at 19.
49. See Force Placement of Terrorism Coverage Leads to Litigation, supra note
44, at 8. Keith Dunsmore, a partner at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP
stated, "If the loan documents do permit the lender to require the insurance, then if
the borrower refuses to maintain the insurance they would be in default .. " Id.
50. See id.; RUBOCK & PHILIPP, supra note 1, at 15.
51. See RUBOCK & PHILIPP, supra note 1, at 11. "It is unclear whether increases
in premiums of merely 50%, or perhaps 450%, would be deemed unreasonable." Id.
52. See id. at 10.
53. See id.
54. Loubier & Aro, supra note 3, at 20.
55. See RUBOCK & PHILIPP, supra note 2, at 10-11. However, considering the
current state of the insurance market, there are several problems with the most
stringent requirement, including a claim of impossibility of performance. See id. at
10.
56. See, e.g., Force Placement of Terrorism Coverage Leads to Litigation, supra
note 44, at 8; Pinover et al., supra note 2, at 15.
57. See Force Placement of Terrorism Coverage Leads to Litigation, supra note
20031
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very expensive, the borrower tried to prevent the lender from
purchasing insurance and passing through the cost of the high
premium. 8
Although many lenders were requiring terrorism insurance,
borrowers were discovering that it was either unavailable or
extremely expensive. 9 After September 11, but before enactment
of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, there were only six
companies offering terrorism insurance and cost predictions
estimated that owning it added $0.20 for each $100 of real estate
value.6" Coverage was most difficult to obtain in large cities.6
Moody's, a national rating agency, contends that coverage is most
difficult to get "for large, trophy buildings, and for office towers of
over 50 stories in central business districts. 6 2  Furthermore,
buildings in large cities (like New York City) are hard to insure
regardless of height.63 In order to ensure coverage, previous
insurer rating requirements were relaxed. 64 Even those who have
44, at 8; Pinover et al., supra note 1, at 15.
58. See Force Placement of Terrorism Coverage Leads to Litigation, supra note
44, at 8; Pinover et al., supra note 1, at 15. In the case of the Conde Nast Building,
the servicer "tried to put the mortgage into default and seize a portion of the $88
million in annual rents to pay for a new terrorism insurance policy." Conde Nast
Deal Downgraded, COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE ALERT, Sept. 20, 2002, at 12.
59. See Loubier & Aro, supra note 3, at 19. "[A]fter September 11, terrorism
insurance became largely unavailable almost overnight and,.., any terrorism
insurance available could be purchased only at prices uneconomic for most insureds."
Id. Some real estate owners have paid as much as 500% more than last year for
insurance coverage. See Warson, supra note 1, at 56.
60. See Warson, supra note 1, at 56. The six companies reportedly offering
terrorism insurance were: American International Group, Inc.; Lloyd's of London;
Berkshire Hathaway Group; The Chubb Corporation; Travelers Insurance Company;
and Liberty Mutual Insurance Group. Id. The policies offered by these companies
did not include losses resulting from chemical, biological, or nuclear causes. Pinover
et al., supra note 1, at 16.
61. Moody's Reiterates Plan to Downgrade CMBS if Terrorism Coverage Lapses,
NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, June 24, 2002, at 10, available at 2002 WL 8159793. One
source stated, "[L]ack of terrorism insurance coverage is limited to big cities, such as
New York, Chicago, and perhaps Washington, D.C." Karen L. Werner, Terrorism
Insurance Conference Resolution Has 'Sticking Points' in Informal Discussions, 79
BANKING REP. 407, 408 (Sept. 16, 2002).
62. RUBOCK & PHILIPP, supra note 1, at 4.
63. Id. at 4 n.5.
64. See RUBOCK & PHILIPP, supra note 1, at 15. For example, Moody's preferred
an insurer to be rated A3 before September 11, but is now willing to accept a rating
of A2. Id.
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been successful in obtaining coverage are still underinsured."
Generally, borrowers are only able to obtain between $75 and
$100 million in terrorism insurance from one insurer.66 Thus for
large loans, they must layer coverage among several different
insurers. 67 The unavailability of terrorism insurance affects both
the current borrower, who may be required to obtain it, as well as
real estate developers, who have shied away from new projects
because of the increased costs associated with obtaining mortgage
loans.68
Lenders are in a predicament.69 They do not want to place
normally good borrowers into default, especially when they are
aware of the high cost of terrorism insurance.7" However, in the
absence of terrorism insurance, the lender would in effect be the
insurer of the property if it was destroyed through an act of
terrorism.7 Lenders have generally avoided placing loans into
default for insufficient terrorism insurance. 7' The economic
downturn has given lenders an additional consideration when
deciding whether to require terrorism insurance. Office space and
hotels face tough times. 73 With less income, some borrowers are
65. Werner, supra note 61, at 408. "[T]he cost is exorbitant and people are being
forced to choose between being under- or uninsured." Id. For example, "The New
York Metropolitan Transit Authority has only $70 million of terrorism insurance to
cover its terminals, bridges and tunnels, and assets worth $1.5 billion." Pinover et al.,
supra note 1, at 15.
66. RUBOCK & PHILIPP, supra note 1, at 5.
67. Id.
68. See Werner, supra note 61, at 408; see also Warson, supra note 1, at 56
(discussing how all new loans are requiring separate terrorism insurance). In order to
obtain a real estate loan, lenders require proof of insurance. Werner, supra note 61,
at 408.
69. See, e.g., Warson, supra note 1, at 56.
70. Id.
71. Cohen, supra note 24 (stating that because of terrorism exclusions, "banks
and other lenders that hold commercial mortgages have become - by default - the
insurer against terrorism").
72. Loubier & Aro, supra note 3, at 19. "The option of calling the mortgages for
a failure to provide adequate insurance is often not a viable option." Cohen, supra
note 24.
73. Brian Lancaster, Commercial Real Estate and CMBS Outlook for 2002, CMBS
WORLD, Summer 2002, at 10, 10-13. Office vacancy rates were at 13.6% in the
beginning of 2002; while hotels' revenue per available room (RevPAR) dropped 30%
after September 11, 2001, maintaining a decrease of between 10% and 15% for most
of 2002. Id. at 10-11.
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
having trouble paying their current mortgage.74  This cash-flow
problem will become amplified if borrowers must add the costs of
terrorism insurance to their operating costs.
Lack of terrorism insurance can affect the value of an asset
even without a terrorist attack.75 "When commercial mortgage
loans become due, there is often a large principal balance
outstanding; that is typically repaid through a sale or
refinancing."76 If the borrower lacks terrorism coverage, though,
he may not be able to sell or refinance.77 This could effectively
stop the purchase and sale of commercial real estate.78
Another consideration is the effect of a high deductible.79
If an act of terrorism destroys an asset, the borrower may be
required to pay a high deductible before receiving any of the
insurance funds.8" The borrower will not be able to borrow more
money on the destroyed asset, and because the deductible is
considered a capital expense, the cost cannot be passed to
tenants.81 This may force the borrower to pay a high percentage of
the damage from his own funds before he can receive any
insurance money.82 Thus, there is a risk of default even if the
property has the required insurance.83 Finally, if the loan is
securitized and the servicer does not declare the borrower in
default for lack of sufficient insurance coverage, bondholders can
sue the servicer if the property is damaged from an act of
terrorism."
74. See id. at 17.
75. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
76. Cohen, supra note 13, at 29.
77. Id.
78. Id. David Creamer, chairman and chief executive of GMAC Commercial
Holding Corp., equates this possibility with the savings and loan crisis. Id.
79. See Glickman, supra note 20, at 542.
80. Id. For example, the deductibles on somiie Boston properties went from
$10,000 (pre-September 11) to $100,000 (post-September 11) per occurrence.
Warson, supra note 1, at 56.
81. Glickman, supra note 20, at 542.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Heidi A. Lawson, Insurance Regulation: The Effects of September 11h
, in
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III. EFFECTS ON CMBS
One advantage to securitizing commercial mortgage loans
is the distribution of investment risk among many investors, rather
than solely upon an originating lender.85 Thus, lenders will not
bear as much of the cost if the asset is destroyed. Each pool and
each class of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
contain mortgage loans of different sizes,86 for different types of
real estate," and for different locations spread out across the
country.88  CMBS reduces risk for investors through
diversification.
If one real estate asset in a conduit CMBS pool was
affected by a terrorist act, each investor would lose a relatively
small amount of money. This is because the loan would be owned
by several investors, each investor owning only a portion, and the
pool containing that loan would contain several other loans.89 The
investors may even be able to recover the value of the land as well
as any insurance proceeds. 9° However, investors may be wary
about investing in the CMBS markets with the outstanding risk of
inadequate terrorism coverage. Most CMBS investors bought into
a particular pool with the assurance that the secured assets had
sufficient and appropriate insurance in the event of loss.9 These
investors are now faced with a novel risk of investment loss which
was not apparent at the time of the investment.92
National rating agencies rate CMBS bonds according to the
likelihood of repayment, or conversely, the probability of a
borrower's default and the severity of loss.93 Investors then rely on
85. See Kronovet, supra note 11, at 288-89.
86. Kronovet interview, supra note 46. The average loan size for a conduit
CMBS transaction is six million dollars. Id.
87. Lancaster, supra note 73, at 17. Retail loans make up 27.8% of CMBS. Id.
88. Kronovet interview, supra note 46.
89. See, e.g., Kronovet, supra note 11, at 289.
90. RUBOCK & PHILIPP, supra note 1, at 8. Land value generally varies between
ten and forty percent of the total value. Id.
91. See Glickman, supra note 20, at 541.
92. See id.
93. See Kronovet, supra note 11, at 308. National Rating agencies include
Moody's Investors Service, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch Investors Service. Id.
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this rating to determine which CMBS bonds to purchase.94
Insurance can be an important issue when determining a CMBS
rating, because an uncovered loss may disrupt payments to the
bondholders. 5 Thus, rating agencies must now factor terrorism
insurance and its presence or absence into the CMBS rating
analysis.96
Each of the three major rating agencies has developed its
own framework for rating CMBS assets since September 11.
97
Moody's places the asset into a class based upon (1) the type of
asset securing the loan and (2) the type of pool in which the
mortgage is placed.9 8 The type of asset is placed into one of three
tiers.99 "Asset Tier 1" includes "trophy" buildings and buildings
located near the trophies, as well as the tallest buildings in a large
central business district and structures that are world or regionally
famous.' 0 "Asset Tier 2" includes large buildings in a central
business district, major regional shopping malls, large apartment
buildings located in major cities, and large complexes housing
defense or iconic-American companies.' "Asset Tier 3"
encompasses all other assets.0 2 The asset is then placed into a
pooling tier.0 3 "Pooling Tier 1" is reserved for single asset deals,
"Pooling Tier 2" includes large loan/fusion deals, and "Pooling
Tier 3" is made up of conduit pools."°
Using this framework, Moody's determined that assets
falling into Asset Tier 1 and Pooling Tier 1 are the most likely
terrorist targets; those in Asset Tier 3 and Pooling Tier 3 are the
least likely targets. 0 5 Due to the nature of CMBS, single asset
deals (Pooling Tier 1) are most risky because if something happens
94. Loubier & Aro, supra note 3, at 20.
95. See id.
96. See infra notes 97 - 126 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 98 - 113 and accompanying text.
98. RUBOCK & PHILIPP, supra note 1, at 6.






105. RUBOCK & PHILIPP, supra note 1, at 9. Asset Tier 1 structures rarely fall
under the Pooling Tier 3 category. Id. at 8.
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to the asset, there is nothing left in the pool. °6 Thus, pooling large
assets is beneficial to mitigate risk. 1°7 There may be levels of risk
within each tier as well. 8 Moody's cites several factors affecting
the rating of the asset within each category. 1° These factors
include: the terrorism coverage retained; the tenants in the
building; the building's security measures; the strength of the
insurance language in the loan documents; the type of building
structure; the function or use of the building; and whether the asset
is located in a Standard Fire Policy state.''
The other two rating agencies are not as specific in their
classifications.'' Standard & Poor's "does not believe it is possible
to predict which buildings are at greater risk of terrorism attacks"
and feels it is "difficult to quantify the risk of terrorism."' 12 Fitch
Ratings bases its classification of terrorist risk on various physical
characteristics of the property "including but not limited to,
proximity to a major transportation hub, height of the building,
symbol of America or proximity to a symbol of America and high
profile tenancy." "'
Utilizing the new standards for classification of risk, rating
agencies have reevaluated many CMBS ratings." 4 Due to the
potential adverse effects of a terrorist attack on CMBS
investments, several CMBS issues had their ratings downgraded." 5
Standard & Poor's elected not to downgrade any CMBS bonds
because it does not believe that "the risk of loss is greater post-
106. See id. The first single asset securitization transaction since September 11,
2001 did not occur until October 2002. See Poonkulali Thangavelu, CMBS is Backed
by NYC Unit, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Sept. 30, 2002, at 11.
107. RUBOCK & PHILIPP, supra note 1, at 8.
108. Id. at 9.
109. Id.
110. Id. See infra notes 220-25 and accompanying text for more on the Standard
Fire Policy.
111. See STANDARD & POOR'S, STANDARD AND POOR'S WON'T TAKE RATING
ACTION ON CMBS TRANSACTION FOR TERRORISM COVERAGE ISSUES (June 10,
2002); FITCH RATINGS, TERRORISM INSURANCE REVIEW: 13 CMBS DEALS ON
RATING WATCH NEGATIVE (June 3, 2002).
112. STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 111.
113. FITCH RATINGS, supra note 111.
114. See RUBOCK & PHILIPP, supra note 1.
115. See PHILIPP & DENT, supra note 5, at 1; Julie Haviv, Newer Type of Bond
May Be Nipped in the Bud - CMBS Market is Slowed First By Attacks, and Then By
Congressional Inaction, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2002, at C13.
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Sept. 11 tha[n] it was before. 116  Moody's downgraded eleven
(previously) AAA-rated CMBS issues in September 2002, after
Congress failed to enact a federal terrorism insurance backstop.7
In the previous fifteen years, Moody's had only downgraded a
total of six CMBS issues." 8 Fitch Ratings also downgraded three
CMBS deals, totaling over $873 million." 9
After the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 was
enacted, the rating agencies did not immediately return the
downgraded CMBS issues to their previous ratings. 120 Instead, the
agencies are waiting to see the industry effects of the Act before
upgrading.' 2' The agencies remain skeptical about the effects of
the Act and contend that many problems remain before the
market can return to normal, if that is even possible. 2 2 Standard
& Poor's criticized the legislation, stating that it creates numerous
problems for insurers. 23  Moody's Investors Service believes the
Act will have a slightly negative impact on the insurance
industry. 124 Moody's thinks that property and casualty insurance
providers remain significantly exposed to terrorism risk.
25
Moody's concludes that the Act has not relieved the rating
problems surrounding terrorism risk, and that several things must
116. Moody's Reiterates Plan to Downgrade CMBS if Terrorism Coverage Lapses,
supra note 61, at 10 (quoting Gale Scott, managing director at Standard & Poor's).
117. Cohen, supra note 13, at 29.
118. Id.
119. Haviv, supra note 115.
120. See Michael Murray, Bush Signs Terrorism Insurance Legislation as
Implementation Procedures Begin, MBA NEWSLINK (Nov. 27, 2002), at
http://mbaa.org/industry/news/02/l127a.htm [hereinafter Michael Murray];
Christopher Oster, Terrorism Bill Boosts Insurers' Risk, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2002,
at C9.
121. See, e.g., Michael Murray, supra note 120.
122. See US Terrorism Insurance: Problem Solved?, REACTIONS, Jan. 2003, at 9,
available at 2003 WL 11763968; TED COLLINS & JAMES ECK, MOODY'S INVESTORS
SERVICE, MOODY'S COMMENTS ON TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE P&C INSURANCE INDUSTRY 1 (Dec. 4, 2002), available at 2002
WL 103428020.
123. See Oster, supra note 120. According to Standard & Poor's, the Act
"increased the risks faced by insurance companies, creating pitfalls and gray areas."
Id. The legislation "amounts to a command from government [for insurers] to get
back into the pool of terrorism risk." Id. (quoting Steven Dreyer, managing director
in Standard & Poor's insurance ratings unit).




happen before downgraded ratings are reexamined: insurers must
comply with the Act; prices of terrorism coverage need to
decrease; availability must increase; and property owners must
purchase the terrorism insurance.126
IV. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
Shortly after September 11, 2001, the House of
Representatives introduced a bill to assist insurance companies
with the costs resulting from acts of terrorism.' 27 House Bill 3210,
or the "Terrorism Risk Protection Act," was quickly passed and
sent to the Senate at the end of 2001.128 The Senate failed to agree
upon a terrorism insurance bill until Summer 2002.129 Several
versions were introduced before the Senate finally passed Senate
Bill 2600, termed the "Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002." 130
The House and Senate versions were sent to conference
committee, where discussions began in order to resolve several
differences between them.11  After little progress, President Bush
called upon the two houses to settle their differences and pass the
legislation. 32  The main conflicts between the houses revolved
around tort reform and repayment provisions.' 33 The House bill
called for a loan to insurance companies. 34  After assuming the
first $1 billion in losses, the government would loan 90% of the
126. See id.; Michael Murray, supra note 120.
127. 2001 Bill Tracking H.R. 3210. H.R. 3210 was introduced on Nov. 1, 2001 and
passed on Nov. 29, 2001. Id.
128. 2001 Bill Tracking H.R. 3210; see Warson, supra note 1, at 56.
129. Warson, supra note 1, at 56.
130. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, S. 2600, 107th Cong. (2002). Other
Senate Bills include S. 1743 and S. 1744. See Thomas A. Player, Jr., Harold D.
Skipper, & Janet Lambert, A Global Definition of Terrorism (June 15, 2002)
(unpublished manuscript, at http://mmmlaw.com/articles/article-152.pdf).
131. See Tad C. Philipp, CMBS: So Far an Off Year for Credit and Volume, ASSET
SECURITIZATION REPORT, July 29, 2002, available at 2002 WL 8148393.
132. Bush, Democrats Press Cases in Insurance Stalemate, WALL ST. J., October 4,
2002, at A16.
133. See Philipp, supra note 131; John D. McKinnon, Congress Will Pass Terror
Insurance, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2002, at A4.
134. See Terrorism Risk Protection Act, H.R. 3210, 107th Cong. (2001); Christian
Murray, Weak Foundation: Lack of Insurance Against Terrorism Hinders Existing
Commercial Buildings and Future Construction, NEWSDAY, Sept. 16, 2002, at A27;
Rizzo, supra note 38, at 13.
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remaining losses to insurance companies, capping government
funding at $100 billion.'35 The Senate bill provided for a grant of
the money with no requirement that it be paid back.'36 The
funding would cover 90% of claims after the first $10 billion, also
with a $100 billion cap. 3 7 The other major conflict was punitive
damage awards.'38 The House bill prohibited punitive damage
awards against building owners, while the Senate bill allowed for
such damages.'39 Under both bills, the claim was to be filed in
federal court. 4 °
The two houses finally agreed upon the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002, signed into law by President Bush on
November 26, 2002.' The final version provides for federal
assistance after property and casualty insurance losses resulting
from an act of terrorism exceed $5 million. 14 2 Insurance companies
must pay a deductible based upon the amount of the insurer's
direct premiums earned over the immediately preceding calendar
year, multiplied by 7% in 2003, 10% in 2004, and 15% in 2005.'4
The federal government will cover 90% of all losses above that
deductible with the insurance companies paying the remaining
10%. 144 Federal funding is capped at $100 billion. 45 The Act also
contains a repayment provision. 146 The government will recover a
portion of the payouts through a surcharge on property and
casualty insurance policy holders. 47 The surcharge is not to
135. See H.R. 3210; Murray, supra note 134; Rizzo, supra note 38, at 13.
136. See S. 2600; Murray, supra note 134; Rizzo, supra note 38, at 14.
137. See S. 2600; Murray, supra note 134; Rizzo, supra note 38, at 14.
138. See H.R. 3210; S. 2600; Murray, supra note 134; Bush, Democrats Press Cases
in Insurance Stalemate, supra note 132.
139. See H.R. 3210; S. 2600; Murray, supra note 134; Bush, Democrats Press Cases
in Insurance Stalemate, supra note 132.
140. H.R. 3210; S. 2600; Murray, supra note 134.
141. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Signs Terrorism
Insurance Act (Nov. 26, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2002/11/20021126-1.html.
142. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, §
102(1)(B)(ii), 116 Stat. 2322 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6701 Note).
143. See id. § 102(7); see also COLLINS & ECK, supra note 122, at 1.
144. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 103(e)(1).
145. See id. § 103(e)(2).
146. See id. § 103(e).
147. See id. § 103(e)(7)(C).
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exceed 3% of the premium, and repayment is capped at $10 billion
for the first year of the program, $12.5 billion for the second year,
and $15 billion for the third.148 Primary insurers must provide
terrorism insurance, and the terms cannot materially differ from
the terms and costs provided for other losses.'49 This is an attempt
to make the costs of obtaining coverage more reasonable. This
provision does not apply to reinsurers; they are not obligated to
return to the terrorism insurance market. 151 Insurers may also get
around this requirement and reinstate terrorism exclusions if
authorized by the insured, or if the insured fails to pay the
increased premium and the insurer provides thirty days notice of
such reinstatement. 151 However, the Act mandates that all insurers
provide the option of terrorism insurance, at least for the first two
years of the program. 152 The Act allows punitive damages, but
expressly prohibits payment of punitive awards by the federal
government. 53 The program ends on December 31, 2005.'4
Many in the industry are hopeful that the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002 will not only make coverage more available,
but also that it will become less expensive to obtain. 55 A return of
reinsurance companies would provide more relief to primary
insurers and possibly expand the market capacity. 156 However,
because the federal government will not help reinsurers recover
any losses sustained from a terrorist act, reinsurers may be
discouraged from accepting some of the terrorism risks.'57
Furthermore, upon making certain disclosures to policyholders,
148. See id. § 103(e)(7).
149. See id. § 103(c).
150. See Michael Murray, supra note 120.
151. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 105(c). The Act does not specify
how long the insurer must wait to receive payment before reinstating the exclusions.
See id.
152. See id. § 103(c). The Secretary of the Treasury may extend these
requirements for another year. Id.
153. See id. § 107(a)(5).
154. See id. § 108(a).
155. See Michael J. Kling, Terrorism Insurance Backstop Creates New Hope for
Industry, COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE INSIGHT, Jan. 2003, at 9.
156. See Michael Murray, supra note 120; Kendall, supra note 2, at 579-80.
157. See Michael Murray, supra note 120; see also supra note 150 and
accompanying text.
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primary insurers may reinstate existing terrorism exclusions.'58
One insurance industry representative stated that the Act may
cause a decrease in premiums for trophy buildings, but an increase
for mainstream properties (including commercial and multifamily
properties).'59  Moody's predicts that although availability of
terrorism insurance will increase, the costs for coverage will
remain high for the near future.
160
Proponents of the legislation proclaim that it was necessary
for the insurance industry to survive.' 61 Many mortgage companies
and special interest groups called upon their members to contact
Congressional representatives in support of the legislation.'62 The
legislation provides funds for insurance companies to recoup
finances. It may also help the insurance consumer.'63  Federal
backing may help ensure that claims are paid and premiums are
lowered because the overall cost to the insurance company will be
lower. However, it will also cost the consumer because federal
funds come from taxpayers. 164  The risk of one insurance
company's insolvency alone would not justify intervention by the
federal government; however, the simultaneous insolvency of
several insurance companies could create substantial problems for
society, thereby justifying intervention. 165 President Bush stated,
"[w]ithout coverage, the economic impact of another terrorist
attack would be incredibly serious. ... Enacting terrorism
insurance will cost us nothing if we experience no further
attacks." 166
158. Michael Murray, supra note 120; supra note 151 and accompanying text.
159. See Michael Murray, supra note 120.
160. COLLINS & ECK, supra note 122.
161. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 134. "Insurance, banking, and real estate
advocacy groups say that a federal backstop is the only answer to the problem." Id.
162. E.g., The Coalition to Insure Against Terrorism, at http://www.insureagainst
terrorism.org (last visited Feb. 9, 2003); H. Rodgin Cohen in his speech to members
of the banking community at the University of North Carolina Banking Law
Institute, supra note 24.
163. See US Terrorism Insurance: Problem Solved?, supra note 122 (stating that
one purpose of the Act is to protect policy-holders).
164. See Werner, supra note 61, at 409.
165. See Player et al., supra note 130, at I.
166. Bush, Democrats Press Cases in Insurance Stalemate, supra note 132.
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Opponents of the legislation argue that the federal funding
will create a windfall for the insurance companies.167 Insurers have
already charged high premiums for coverage, and nothing in the
federal legislation requires repayment of those premiums.
168
Additionally, taxpayers will be paying between eighty and ninety
percent of the claims; 169 yet the general public remained relatively
silent on the issue. 7' Many argue that the insurance industry is
private and the federal government should not get involved in
bearing the cost of private industry.171 This legislation would also
impose a large burden on the federal government.172  The
Washington Post came out against a federal backstop, stating that
"Congress is poised to shower taxpayers' money on insurance
companies for no good reason." '' i 3 Finally, as more insurance
companies begin to offer terrorism insurance, there seems to be
less need for federal government assistance.
1 74
In large part, the debate surrounding the federal legislation
relates to the question of who should bear the risk of another
terrorist attack on real estate. Although the cost to CMBS
investors may be small,1 75 there is a strong argument that passive
investors should not be asked to bear this type of risk. These
investors should not be asked to assume a risk for free when the
insurers are unwilling to take on the risk even in exchange for a
167. Werner, supra note 61, at 409.
168. See id.
169. Id. Senator Phil Gramm opposes the Act because it overexposes taxpayers to
losses. See David Rogers, Terrorism- Insurance Measure Gains Approval From
Senate, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2002, at A6.
170. Pinover et al., supra note 1, at 16 ("Tenants, business vendees, consumers,
and the general public, who will ultimately foot the bill for expensive terrorism
insurance coverage, have yet to raise their voice in protest.")
171. See Loubier & Aro, supra note 3, at 21. Some have characterized the
legislation as "a bailout of the insurance industry." Id. at 21.
172. See, e.g., Loubier & Aro, supra note 3, at 21.
173. Pork for Insurers, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2002, at A24. The article cites
conflicting reports of the current effects on the real estate industry, including a study
by the Federal Reserve finding no decrease in lending as a result of lacking terrorism
insurance. See id.
174. Cohen, supra note 13; see also Letter from Travis B. Plunkett, Legislative
Director, and J. Robert Hunter, Director of Insurance, Consumer Federation of
America, to Senator Paul S. Sarbanes and Congressman Michael G. Oxley 1 (Oct. 7,
2002), at http://www.consumerfed.org/terrorjinsurance-conference.pdf.
175. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
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high premium. 76 Borrowers assume many risks in connection with
their real estate,' perhaps they should be required to bear this
risk as well. It is important to remember, however, that without
terrorism insurance it is the lender who will be left with nothing
but the dirt when the borrower cannot afford to pay.17 8  The
terrorism insurance legislation subsidizes some costs for the
insurance companies. 179 This legislation shifts most of the risk to
American taxpayers. 8 ° It may not be fair to ask that the American
people bear the risk and resulting costs of an attack on a piece of
real estate.
A possible compromise could have been to require a large
loss before federal funding is activated. If the loss is great, there
will be considerable claims on insurance companies. Since
insurance companies cannot afford to pay significant sums in the
near future, this could lead to more insolvencies.181 Insolvencies
would leave unpaid claims as well as consumers with no insurance.
Thus, federal funding would be beneficial. However, requiring a
large loss first removes any question about insurers receiving a
windfall. The Act's threshold is $5 million, which seems easily
affordable by insurance companies.'82
The insurance and banking industries are calling for a
longer-term solution than that currently offered by the federal
legislation.'83 These proponents argue that insurance companies
may never be able to offer affordable coverage on valuable,
vulnerable real estate assets.'84 On the other hand, long-term
insurance protection does not seem different from some other
176. See TAD PH1LIPP, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, CMBS 3Q 2002: TERRORISM
INSURANCE AND BALLOON REFINANCING RISKS OVERHANG MARKET 6 (October 23,
2002).
177. Kronovet interview, supra note 46.
178. Id.; see Cohen, supra note 24; supra note 71.
179. See Terrorism Risk Protection Act, H.R. 3210, 107th Cong. (2001); Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act of 2002, S. 2600, 107th Cong. (2002).
180. See Werner, supra note 61, at 409.
181. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 24; US Terrorism Insurance - Problem Solved?,
supra note 122; supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 19 (citing Kendall). Five million dollars seems low considering
that the insurance industry could sustain losses of more than fifty billion dollars prior
to September 11
" before any consideration of insolvency. See id.
183. See, e.g., Philipp, supra note 131 (calling a long-term solution "optimal").
184. See Loubier & Aro, supra note 3, at 21.
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types of insurance. The calculation of risk is more difficult
because terrorism is rare, making it hard to predict. 85 However,
insurance is available to cover other rare, destructive events.'86
One article states that terrorist attacks "remain unlikely, but...
are not less probable than an earthquake or category 5 tornado." '187
In addition, the risk associated with loss from a fire seems
comparable to that associated with loss from terrorism. A fire
resulting from terrorism would be covered by the Act but arson
would not be covered, though both could potentially destroy the
real estate asset. In fact, fire is generally what ends up destroying
a building attacked by terrorists.188
V. ELEMENTS OF TERRORISM INSURANCE
There are several issues that need to be addressed in both
private terrorism insurance policies as well as government
legislation that supports terrorism insurance. Lenders and
insureds should keep these issues in mind when analyzing or
purchasing terrorism insurance.
A. Definition of Terrorism
Several definitions of terrorism have been offered since
September 11. One article argues that a global definition of
terrorism should be agreed upon to promote efficiency, remove
some uncertainty related to conducting business internationally,
and prevent gaps in coverage. 89 An industry-wide definition
would also be beneficial to maintain uniform exclusions among
varying policies. There are many elements to a clear, workable
definition of terrorism. It is worth briefly exploring these elements
185. For a full discussion on this topic, see supra notes 26-36 and accompanying
text. However, there have been more than 14,000 international terrorist attacks since
1968. Rizzo, supra note 38, at 12.
186. See, e.g., Glickman, supra note 20, at 541-44 (discussing insurance for events
such as floods, windstorms, and earthquakes).
187. Adelson et al., supra note 32, at 222. But see RUBOCK & PHILIPP, supra note
1 (distinguishing acts of terrorism from natural events such as floods and earthquakes
in the risk calculation analysis).
188. Glickman, supra note 20, at 544.
189. See Player et al., supra note 130, at 1, 5.
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to help alleviate some of the uncertainty associated with what
constitutes an act of terrorism.
One article reviews several industry definitions of
terrorism, including one used by the United Kingdom, one by the
International Underwriting Association, and the definitions
offered in various Congressional bills. 9 ° The authors use various
definitions to extract the elements of a good definition, which
include: a categorization of the perpetrators; motives for the
action; method of harm utilized (i.e., whether violence is required);
loss threshold required before the act is considered terrorism; and
whether government certification is required and by whom.' 91
State-sponsorship requirements are usually not included in the
definitions." These authors offer their own global definition of
terrorism (the Player definition):
An act, including, but not limited to, the use of force
or violence, committed by any person or persons
acting on behalf of or in connection with any
organization creating serious violence against a
person or serious damage to property or a serious
risk to the health or safety of the public undertaken
to influence a government for the purpose of
advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.
Such act shall be certified as an "Act of Terrorism"
by the senior judicial or administrative official
designated by the adopting government and shall
not be subject to appeal.
93
A definition proposed by the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) was critiqued in a recent law
review article.' 94 The author found several potential ambiguities
190. See id. at 3, Table 1.
191. See id. at 4.
192. See id. at 4.
193. Id. at 5.
194. See Kendall, supra note 2, at 589-91. The NAIC definition is:
[A]n act, intentionally dangerous or destructive to human life,
health, tangible or intangible property or infrastructure, carried
out by a person or group that is not an agent of a sovereign state,
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stemming from the grammatical structure of the NAIC's proposed
definition.'95 She offered her own definition for use by insurers,
incorporating elements from several other proposals (the Kendall
definition):
"Act of terrorism" means an act that is dangerous to
or destructive of: human life; human health; or
property of any kind. This includes both tangible
and intangible property. It includes real property
and personal property. It includes infrastructure
such as roads, bridges, and tunnels; power systems
and water systems; broadcasting systems and
computer systems. The act must be planned or
carried out by a person or group acting on behalf of
an organization based outside of the United States.
The organization may be, but is not limited to, one
that: claims to be motivated by political, religious, or
social beliefs; or aims to intimidate, influence, or
coerce the United States government or its citizens.
The organization may, but need not, be: a sovereign
entity - an independent state or government; a
quasi-sovereign entity - one that has some traits of a
sovereign entity; or a de facto government - one
that has taken over or separated from a regular
government. It need not be an organization of a
particular size. "Acting on behalf of" an
organization means: acting as its agent or
representative; affiliated with it; or being sponsored
or supported by it in any way. This includes
receiving assistance, funding, training, direction, or
equipment from the organization. "Based outside
but is acting on behalf of an organization based in a country other
than the United States, and motivated by political, religious, or
social beliefs.
Id. at 589.
195. See id. at 589-91. Kendall stated at least six potential problems with the
definition's interpretation, including "[w]hether it is the 'person or group' or the
'organization based in a country other than the United States' that must be
'motivated by political, religious, or social beliefs."' Id. at 590.
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of the United States" means founded, located,
headquartered, or maintaining a presence outside of
the United States. "Losses due to acts of terrorism"
includes losses incurred in attempted acts of
terrorism.
96
The definition adopted must be broad enough to include
unforeseeable acts of terrorism, as no one could have imagined the
events of September 11, 2001. However, the definition must also
be narrowly tailored to exclude acts of war,1 97 especially if the
difference determines the activation and use of a federal insurance
backstop. The Kendall definition specifically defines each term
utilized, thereby limiting problems with interpretation. 98 Adding
some elements of the Player definition to the Kendall definition
would create the best option.
Both definitions require an act.' 99 The final definition
should include Player's idea of not limiting the act to one of force
or violence. However, Kendall's statement that the act can be
"dangerous to" human life, instead of requiring that "serious
196. Id. at 594-95 (taking into consideration several definitions offered by
Congress and the United States Code).
197. See id. at 591-93; RUBOCK & PHILIPP, supra note 1, at 6. One widely used
definition is that proposed by the Insurance Services Office (ISO) in its standard
terrorism exclusion policy. See RUBOCK & PHILIPP, supra note 1, at 6. The ISO
defines terrorism as
[a]ctivities against persons, organizations, or property of any
nature that involves the following: 1. [u]se or threat of force or
violence; or commission or threat of a dangerous act; or
commission or threat of an act that interferes with or disrupts an
electronic, communication, information or mechanical system; and
2. [w]hen one or both of the following applies: a. [t]he effect is to
intimidate or coerce a government or the civilian population or
any segment thereof; or to disrupt any segment of the economy; or
b. [i]t appears that the intent is to intimidate or coerce a
government or to further political, ideological, religious, social, or
economic objectives or to express (or express opposition to) a
philosophy or ideology.
Id. at 6. This definition has been criticized for being so broad that insurance
companies could "apply this exclusion [in coverage] to any major event where the
culprits have not announced themselves or been otherwise identified," including
events caused by organized crime or unexplained fires. Id.
198. See Kendall, supra note 2, at 594-95.
199. See Player et al., supra note 130, at 5; Kendall, supra note 2, at 594.
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violence" must be committed against a person, is more inclusive.2 °°
Both definitions allow leeway for the type of organization carrying
out the acts, but again the Kendall definition is more specific.0 1
The Player definition does not require that the organization be
based outside of the United States. 2 2  The Player definition is
meant to be a global definition, allowing it to be widely adopted
and cited.20 3 No loss threshold is required in either definition.2 4
Finally, any definition of terrorism should include Player's
certification requirement, which limits discrepancies and ensuing
litigation.20 5
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 defines an "act
of terrorism., 20 6 The definition provides that the Secretary of the
Treasury, Secretary of State, and Attorney General must certify
the act as one of terrorism.20 7 Their decision cannot be delegated
and is not reviewable.2 18 The definition specifies that the act must
be violent, or dangerous to human life, property, or
infrastructure. 20 9 The act must have resulted in damage within the
United States (in limited, specified cases damage outside of the
United States will qualify). 20  There may be any number of
perpetrators acting on behalf of any foreign person or foreign
interest.2 1 The act must be part of an effort to coerce the people,
policy, or government of the United States.212 The definition
specifically excludes acts committed as part of a declared war.21 3
This definition is not as thorough and the terms are not as
defined as the Player or Kendall definitions. The definition does
200. See Player et al., supra note 130, at 5; Kendall, supra note 2, at 594.
201. See Kendall, supra note 2, at 594-95.
202. See Player et al., supra note 130, at 5.
203. See id.
204. See id.; Kendall, supra note 2, at 594-95.
205. See Player et al., supra note 130, at 1, 5.
206. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 102(1), 116 Stat.
2322 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6701 Note).
207. Id. § 102(1)(A).
208. Id. § 102(1)(C) and (D).
209. Id. § 102(1)(A)(ii).
210. Id. § 102(1)(A)(iii).
211. Id. § 102(1)(A)(iv).
212. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 102(1)(A)(iv),
116 Stat. 2322 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6701 Note).
213. Id. § 102(1)(B)(i).
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incorporate several aspects of the Player and Kendall definitions:
it requires an act; its requirement of "dangerous to" human life,
etc. is more inclusive than requiring only violence; it allows leeway
for the type of organization behind the acts; and it excludes acts of
war. 214  However, some ambiguous terms are not defined or
qualified." 5 For example, property, infrastructure, and when
damage outside of the United States is sufficient, are all
undefined. 2 6 The certification requirement, however, eliminates
any need to ponder the definition's problems. 217  Three people
determine whether or not an act is one of terrorism, and their
decision is final.2 18 In making their determination, hopefully they
will consider the accepted industry definitions and explanations.
Even if a definition of terrorism cannot be agreed upon for
global use, it is necessary for the insurance industry to agree on
one definition. This would provide clarity to purchasers and
lenders about what is excluded from the all-risk policy and what is
included in a separate terrorism insurance policy. This may help
to eliminate gaps in coverage.1 9 It would also allow lenders and
insureds to determine what is excluded from their supplemental
policy that is also excluded from the all-risk policy (i.e. events that
are not covered at all).
B. Standard Fire Policy
Insurers also need to account for fire provisions already
included in "all risk" policies. Thirty states require property
insurance to cover losses resulting from direct fire damage
regardless of the cause of the fire, including terrorism.220 This is
called the Standard Fire Policy (SFP).2 1' The SFP provision
214. See id. § 102(1).
215. Id. § 102(1)(A)(iii).
216. Id.
217. The certification requirement can be found at § 102(1)(A).
218. See Id. § 102(1)(C) and (D).
219. C.f Loubier & Aro, supra note 3, at 20 ("[C]ounsel should make certain that
the language of the terrorism coverage mirrors the terrorism exclusion in the all-risk
property policy.").




negates the lack of terrorism insurance if loss is sustained from
fire.222 It is likely that an asset will be destroyed or impaired by a
fire resulting from a terrorist act.223 : Therefore, terrorism
exclusions are based largely on "concurrent causation," or the
"precipitating event that causes the perils to be triggered. 2 2 4
Insurers providing coverage in these states will probably adjust
premiums to account for terrorist risks.225
C. Definition of "Occurrence"
Insurance companies will also need to designate a standard
definition covering multiple acts of terrorism. The Insurance
Services Office standard insurance exclusion, adopted in most
states, defines one "incident" of terrorism as acts that happen
within 72 hours and appear to be in concert. 6 As seen with the
World Trade Center, terrorism acts may involve more than one
act, but create just one occurrence for insurance purposes.227 A
New York judge declared that the crash of one plane into each of
the two towers of the World Trade Center was only one
occurrence.228 The definition stated in the World Trade Center
policy was
'Occurrence' shall mean all losses or damages that
are attributable directly or indirectly to one cause or
to one series of similar causes. All such losses will
be added together and the total amount of such
losses will be treated as one occurrence irrespective




223. Glickman, supra note 20, at 544.
224. Id. Glickman contends that one debate surrounding the World Trade Center
attacks is whether the cause was the airplanes hitting the buildings or the terrorist
plot putting them there. Id. at 544-45.
225. Loubier & Aro, supra note 3, at 19.
226. Id.
227. SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. World Trade Center Properties LLC, 222 F.
Supp. 2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 398.
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The judge held that "when two hijacked planes hit the Twin
Towers in a sixteen minute period, the total destruction of the
World Trade Center resulted from 'one series of similar
causes."' 23° The original House bill, H.R. 3210, specified that if
federal assistance was requested, the Treasury Department should
determine the number of occurrences.23" ' There is no similar
provision in the final legislation, but it is possible that the
Secretary of the Treasury will specify the number of occurrences
when making his certification that a terrorist act occurred.
D. Cancellation
Borrowers who are able to secure terrorism insurance may
still run into problems with their coverage. Many policies allow
the insurer to cancel on short notice.232 Thus, lenders and
borrowers remain paralyzed, knowing that the insurance company
could cancel their policy any time the government comes out with
a new warning that indicates an increased risk. Insureds should be
sure that they understand what circumstances permit the insurer to
cancel the policy.
E. Ancillary damage
One must make sure that the terrorism insurance policy
will cover damage to the building even when the terrorist act was
directed at a nearby building.233 Some policies may only cover
direct damage to a building, leaving borrowers without funds if
their building was damaged because of its proximity to an act of
234terrorism.
230. Id. at 399.
231. H.R. 3210, Terrorism Risk Protection Act, 107th Cong. (2001).
232. Loubier & Aro, supra note 3, at 20.
233. See RUBOCK & PHILIPP, supra note 1, at 12.
234. See, e.g., id.
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F. Biological and Chemical Warfare
Most terrorism insurance policies exclude coverage of
biological and chemical warfare, including the Insurance Services
Office standard exclusion, which served as the benchmark in most
states.35  Proposed federal legislation also excluded this
coverage.2 36  The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 says
nothing about biological or chemical warfare.237 However, the
Treasury Department has issued interim guidelines specifying that
the "make available" requirement in § 103(c)(1) does not include
all types of risk.2 38 An insurer is not required to cover nuclear,
biological, or chemical events if that insurer is outside of a state's
regulatory reach or if the state allows the exclusion.239
G. Punitive Damages
The Senate bill allowed claimants to sue building owners
and operators for punitive damages for losses after a terrorist
act.240  Democrats "argue that if taxpayers help pay for losses
caused by terrorist attacks through the federal backstop bill, they
shouldn't have to pay for settlements as well., 241  The final
legislation allows for punitive damages to be assessed against
building owners; however, it specifies that the settlements will not
come from federal funds. 42 Thus, owners must be prepared to pay
any damages from their own funds. It may be prudent to sue
owners for reckless security measures allowing an act of terrorism
235. See Loubier & Aro, supra note 3, at 19-20.
236. See Terrorism Risk Protection Act, H.R. 3210, 107th Cong. (2001); Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act of 2002, S. 2600, 107th Cong. (2002).
237. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6701 Note).
238. See Interim Guidance Concerning New Statutory Disclosure and Mandatory
Availability Requirements of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, 67 Fed. Reg.




241. Warson, supra note 1, at 56. Much of that money would go to trial lawyers.
Id. As of September 2002, lawsuits related to the September 11 events totaled
around $20 billion. Id.
242. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 107(a)(5).
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to occur; however, owners cannot control acts of terrorism,"' and
therefore should not be liable simply because their building was
destroyed by a terrorist act. Commentators have argued against
punitive damages stating, "[g]iven the random nature of terrorism,




One industry representative called 2001 the most important
year out of the past twenty-five for the banking industry, citing the
events of September 11 as a main factor.245 Terrorism insurance
has "affected to some degree every insured real estate asset and
mortgage loan in the United States. 2 46 Substantial cost burdens
have been placed on borrowers. 24' These costs are deterring future
real estate projects, thereby decreasing the number of new loans.248
Lenders will incur substantial costs if the borrower's mortgaged
asset is destroyed by an act of terrorism, with no insurance
coverage to fall back on.2 49 The lack of terrorism insurance could
result in large losses for borrowers, lenders, insurance companies,
and investors.
Since primary insurers can no longer shift risks to
reinsurers, they are shifting risks to policyholders through lower
coverage limits and higher premiums.25 ° These premiums will then
be shifted to the tenants through higher rent.25  Higher rent will
place landlords at a competitive disadvantage to properties that do
not require terrorism insurance.252
More insurance providers are needed to fill the void.
However, they may be unwilling due to the uncertain risks, the
243. Loubier & Aro, supra note 3, at 20. Building owners can not prevent
terrorism; that is the federal government's responsibility. Id.
244. Id.
245. Cohen, supra note 24.
246. Loubier & Aro, supra note 3, at 18.
247. See, e.g., Warson, supra note 1.
248. See supra notes 9-10, 68 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 71, 178 and accompanying text.
250. See Pinover et al., supra note 1, at 14.
251. See Warson, supra note 1.
252. See RUBOCK & PHILIPP, supra note 1, at 4 n.6.
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difficulty in calculating such risks, and the high costs should an act
of terrorism occur.253 An increase in policy writers could be
forthcoming, though, as many insurers are beginning to see large
increases in business and revenue due to higher premiums. 4
Terrorism insurance is the new reality of an unsure world.
Until insurance companies offer terrorism coverage at reasonable
prices, the dilemmas will remain for borrowers, lenders, and
investors. The government has enacted a federal backstop, the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, to assist insurance
companies and help promote a more competitive terrorism
insurance market.255 But much debate surrounds the legislation. 6
Insurance companies are hopeful for relief, but are still not
satisfied. 7 Many in the real estate industry are skeptical about
the Act's effectiveness, and taxpayers are left wondering why they
are poised to subsidize insurance company losses.258
There are several issues that must be examined when
purchasing terrorism insurance. Insurance companies should
agree on a standard definition of terrorism. 259  The lender and
borrower need to examine the definitions and compare the all-risk
policy to the separate terrorism policy to check for gaps in
coverage. 260  They must also make sure they are covered for
ancillary damage to the asset. 61 Finally, insurers and insureds
must be aware of the Standard Fire Policy of the state.262
There are many considerations, and uncertainties,
surrounding terrorism insurance. The provisions of the recently
enacted Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, as well as the
future of terrorism coverage, must be worked out through practice
and application, and probably the court system.263 September 11,
253. See supra notes 19-43 and accompanying text.
254. See Murray, supra note 134; Gjertsen, supra note 23.
255. See supra notes 141-60 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 161-80 and accompanying text.
257. See US Terrorism Insurance - Problem Solved?, supra note 122.
258. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text; Werner, supra note 61.
259. See supra text accompanying note 219.
260. See Loubier & Aro, supra note 3; supra note 219.
261. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 221-25 and accompanying text.
263. The Department of the Treasury is charged with guiding industry compliance
of the Act. Interim guidelines may be found at http://www.treas.gov/offices/
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2001 was a day of mass destruction and horrific consequences.
Many changes have taken place as a result, changes that have
affected almost every United States citizen. As the country
struggles to deal with the aftermath, its people are left to speculate
about what tomorrow will bring.
ALISON R. ORLANS
domestic-finance/financial-institution/terrorism-insurance/interim-guidance.htmI (last
visited Feb. 10, 2003).
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